Canary DVN
The verification layer. What Canary DVN does, what every message gets, and the numbers behind it.
Canary DVN is the verification primitive, the layer that decides whether a cross-chain message is real, final and exactly what the source chain says, and proves it before signing.
The design goal is simple to state and hard to achieve. It should be cryptographically impossible for Canary, or anyone who compromises Canary, to produce a false attestation, not merely expensive or unlikely. The whole security stack exists to meet that goal.
Most verifier operators run the same shared reference implementation, where the practical difference between them is which cloud holds the signing key. Canary is a fully independent client, written from scratch in Go, because the verification standard Canary enforces does not exist off the shelf.
At a glance
Client
Fully independent, written from scratch in Go
Execution environment
AWS Nitro Enclaves in production; additional independent TEE vendors in integration
Footprint per node
1 vCPU, 2GB RAM
Throughput
700+ requests per second per node
Verification latency
Sub-100ms
Throughput against the shared reference implementation
Roughly 15x on the same workload
Quorum
2-of-3 standard, 3-of-4 on high-traffic chains, custom for high-value applications
Ecosystem position
Part of the default security configuration on LayerZero
Coverage
140+ chains
In production
Since January 2025
Cross-chain volume secured
$53.4B+ cumulative, as of 7 October 2026
Messages verified
1.6M+, as of 7 October 2026
Uptime
100%
Security incidents
Zero
Part of the LayerZero default
Canary is part of the default security configuration on LayerZero. New deployments that keep the default configuration ship with Canary verifying their cross-chain messages from day one, on pathways where Canary operates, with no integration work.
Applications that set their own configuration choose their DVN set explicitly. Canary's recommendation for those applications, and the reasoning behind it, is on Recommended DVN sets.
What every message gets
Multiple independent RPC sources, with variance checks across them, so one wrong or lagging source is outvoted rather than believed.
SSL certificate pinning inside the enclave, so the data path itself is authenticated.
Authenticated headers and replay protection on every request.
Hardware-isolated TEE execution with hardware-level attestation of the code that ran.
A k-of-n quorum across independent operators and infrastructure providers.
Per-chain confirmation floors that Canary sets above network defaults, which no application configuration can lower.
Multisig, geographic and infrastructure redundancy, with no single point of failure.

What you do not get
You do not get a signature on anything Canary cannot prove, and that is the product.
If a check fails, the sources cannot be reconciled or quorum cannot be reached, Canary does not sign, and it never signs before the confirmation floor is reached. The message does not reach quorum on that pathway and nothing settles. Every refusal is logged with its reason, as described on Refusal transparency.
Standalone, or with Cipher
The DVN runs standalone, and every application that uses it receives Canary's core verification standard. Canary Cipher builds on top of it for protocols that want a second question asked before anything is signed: not only whether the message is valid, but whether the transfer should happen at all.
With collateral evidence
For assets whose backing matters on every transfer, such as stablecoins and tokenised funds, Canary Collateral Proofs are designed to add the backing information needed to evaluate a transfer against the asset's broader accounting rules.
The question is then not only whether the message is authentic. It is also whether the movement preserves the relationship between the asset's backing and its obligations across chains. A transfer should not create duplicate claims, overlook an unsettled transfer, or treat each chain as though it had a separate claim on the same reserve pool.
The check of this kind already in production on the DVN path is reserve accounting, which runs in Canary Cipher. Where a route requires Canary's approval and the collateral checks are enforced, a failing transfer is not approved.