> For the complete documentation index, see [llms.txt](https://canary-1.gitbook.io/canary/llms.txt). Markdown versions of documentation pages are available by appending `.md` to page URLs; this page is available as [Markdown](https://canary-1.gitbook.io/canary/reference/glossary.md).

# Glossary

The terms the rest of the docs rely on.

## Core terms

**Assurance Layer.** Canary's role in the stack: the place where evidence is gathered and checked before value moves. Canary DVN, Canary Cipher, Canary Cosigner and Canary Collateral Proofs sit inside it.

**Attestation.** A hardware-signed statement from a trusted execution environment that identifies exactly which code ran and binds the results it computed.

**Confirmation floor.** The minimum confirmation depth Canary requires on a chain, set above the network default and not configurable downward.

**DVN.** Decentralised verifier network. An independent verifier of cross-chain messages within an application's security stack.

**Enclave.** The isolated environment inside a TEE where Canary's verification code and signing keys live.

**Fail-closed.** Uncertainty resolves to refusal, by construction.

**k-of-n quorum.** Agreement of at least k independent parties out of n before a result stands.

**Measurement.** The cryptographic fingerprint of the code and configuration loaded into an enclave, recorded in its attestation. Any change to the code or policy changes the measurement.

**Refusal.** The absence of Canary's signature. For the DVN, the message does not reach quorum and nothing settles. For Cosigner configured as a required approver, the issuer's quorum cannot complete.

**Source variance check.** Cross-verification of the same data across independent providers, so one wrong source is outvoted rather than believed.

**TEE.** Trusted execution environment. Hardware-isolated execution whose code and memory are protected and whose behaviour can be attested.

## LayerZero terms

**OApp.** An omnichain application: the application whose messages are being verified.

**Pathway.** A source chain and destination chain pair. Verification is configured per pathway, in both directions.

**Security stack.** The set of DVNs, thresholds and confirmation requirements an application configures.

**ULN.** The library that enforces a security stack onchain. DVN sets are applied to it through `setConfig`, with addresses in ascending order.

## Canary Cipher terms

**Cipher security engine.** The component the DVN consults for checks: reserves, burns, chain state, node health and protocol-supplied sources.

**Hook.** A check executed in the verification path, before an attestation exists.

**Mint-and-burn validation.** No mint is attested without its corresponding burn or lock.

**Observe mode.** A check running against real traffic and recording its decisions without gating anything.

**Reserve accounting.** Continuous verification that issued supply stays within verified backing on cross-chain pathways.

**Supply delta.** The change in issued supply a message would create if it were signed.

**Verdict.** The engine's answer to a check: yes, no or don't know. Only a yes proceeds.

## Canary Cosigner terms

**Canary Cosigner.** Independent collateral verification before every mint and redemption. It joins the issuer's existing signing quorum and co-signs only when the required checks pass.

**Co-sign.** Cosigner's passing outcome. It adds its signature so the issuer's quorum can complete.

**Hold.** Cosigner's third outcome alongside co-sign and refuse. A request is held for further checks and review on an anomaly, such as unusual size, velocity or counterparty, or inconsistent records, before any signature is produced.

**Required approver.** A signer whose approval the issuer's authorisation policy requires. Configured this way, Cosigner's checks become a condition of execution.

**Screening cosigner.** An automated signer in a quorum that simulates a transaction and scores it against threat intelligence and policy. It answers whether a transaction is dangerous, and does not verify backing.

**Transaction-bound proof.** A zero-knowledge proof of an enclave attestation that commits to one specific request, so it cannot be reused for another.

## Canary Collateral Proofs terms

**Canary Collateral Proofs.** The product designed to verify what backs an asset, show users where trust still sits, and supply the same evidence to Canary Cosigner and Canary DVN.

**Collateral proof.** The verified result for one asset and one request: the backing read from every source, reconciled against the asset's obligations after the requested change, and attested from inside a trusted execution environment, with each record's source and limits kept visible. It is contrasted with self-reported reserves.

**Duplicate claim.** The same claim on the backing existing on more than one chain at once, for example when supply is minted on a destination chain without the matching burn or lock on the source chain. Collateral checks on cross-chain movement are designed to prevent it.

**Notary.** A party that contributes verification evidence about a source. Several notaries reading the same source corroborate it, and are not presented as several independent sources of truth.

**Proof-enabled design.** The intended design in which an onchain verifier checks a zero-knowledge proof of the accepted attestation and its bound result, so verification becomes part of approval without all of the underlying records being published.

**Third-party evidence.** Custodian records, administrator data, independent confirmations and other proofs that add checks to the verified position, each with its scope and limits shown.

**Transparency view.** The dashboard side of Collateral Proofs. It shows what backs the asset, who controls it, where each record came from, how it was verified, how current it is, and what still needs trust.

**Trust dependency.** An institution, record or assumption that users still rely on, and that cryptographic verification cannot remove.

**Verification window.** The period within which a record counts as current. Evidence outside it is shown as stale and is not treated as current when a protected action is evaluated.